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In the Supreme Court·
of the State of Utah
CHIEF CONSOLIDATE MINING COMPANY,

Case No. 7323

Ap pel/ant,

vs.

STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondellt.

Case No. 7334

PARK LTTAH CONSOLIDATED MINING
COMPANY,
Appellant,

vs.

SUMMIT COUNTY, et al,
Respondent.

SILVER KING COALITION MINING

Case No. 7332
Appellant,

vs.

STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

UNITED STATES SMELTING REFINING AND
MINING COMPANY,

Case No. 7324

Appellant,

vs.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al,
Respondent.

KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,

Case No. 7297

AppellaJZt,

vs.

STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

1

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in the Appellant's Brief is substantially correct in stating the contentions and allegations
3
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of the various appellants as set forth in their· complaints and
amended complaints. Such statement of facts is therefore accepted except as it may be augmented to some extent throughout the argument in this brief by reference to the pleadings
in the cases and by referring more fully to matters in the
pleadings not covered in the statement of facts of the appellants.
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ARGUMENT
The Appellants have set forth their arguments under
four subdivisions numbered one to four, the latter having subheadings (a), (b), and (c). We believe that all of these
arguments can conveniently and effectively be met under the
following headings:
1. The Subsidy Payments Under the Premium Price Pbn
were Properly Included in the Basis for Determining the Mi!1c
Occupation Tax.

2. The Subsidy Payments Under the Premium Price Plan
were Properly Included in Determining Gross Proceeds and
Thereby Fixing the Assessed Value of the Mines.
(a) The inclusion of payments under the premium price
plan in the Net Proceeds Tax Base would not be
unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT I
THE SUBSIDY PAYMENTS UNDER THE PREMIUM
PRICE PLAN WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE
4
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BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE MINE OCCUPATION
TAX.
One of the arguments set forth by the appellants is that
the premium price plan was "an outright subsidy arrangement." We do not believe it makes any difference by wh'.tt
name the payments are designated which were made und~r
the premium price plan. If, however, by this argument appellants mean to indicate that such payments were outright gifts
to the mining company and had no relationship whatsoevt!r
to the price paid for the ore or metals or to the value thereof
and could therefore not be considered in any manner in arriving at a proper tax base in connection with the taxes to be
assessed against the mining companies then such argument
is absurd.
In Appellants' Brief they set forth under Argument 1, in
great detail excerpts from a report made by the Metals Reserve Company to a committee of Congress. In view of the
fact that these cases are before this court on judgments of
dismissals entered after the court had sustained demurrers
to the complaints and amended complaints and after appellants
had declined to amend further their complaints, it seems
to us improper to endeavor to bring into the record such
extraneous matters as reports of the Metals Reserve Company
to a Congressional committee. It is our understanding that
under such circumstances the cases will be decided by this
court upon the pleadings as filed in the court below and the
rulings of the court thereon. If the report to the Congressional
committee had been introduced or an attempt made to intro-
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duce the same at a trial it would have been inadmissible as
hearsay and surely in a case brought to this court on an appeal
from an order sustaining a demurrer and a subsequent order
dismussing the complaint there is no place for such a report.
Nevertheless, let us examine here just briefly what the
situation is with regard to the nature of these payments. The
very title of the plan is significant in showing that the amounts
paid thereunder were to be and were a part of the price of the
ore or metals produced. It was called the "premium price
plan." The pleadings in these cases, and particularly the
amended complaint in the Kennecott case, bring the ca5es
right in line with the statement of Mr. Justice Wolfe in his
concurring opinion in Combined Metals Reduction Co. et al.
vs. State Tax Commission et al., 176 P. (2d) 614, wherein he
states:
"That the so-called subsidy was in fact considered as
an additional price for the metal in the ore is borne
out by the fact that at first it was announced that the
Metals Reserve Company would pay as an overall
price, the ceiling plus the premium prices for domestic
ores where production exceeded quotas which were to
be fixed. But under the Emergency Price Control Act
the Metals Reserve Company could not sell for any
more than the maximum price established. Hence, if
the Metals Reserve Company had paid respectively
17c for copper, llc for lead and 9Vtic for zinc, it would
have been required to have them smelted on a toll
basis and then sold to the fabricator for 12c, 61f2c and
81Ac per pound respectively for copper, lead and zinc.
While the ultimate outlay to the Government would
have been substantially the same, it was simpler to
have the mills or smelters pay only ceiling prices for
the· metals, the Metals Reserve Company paying the

6
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producer the premiwn price if applicable. But eveQ
this method required a change in the regulation of
the Office of Price Administration in May, 1942. This
was immediately after setting up the 'premium price
plan.' The change in the regulation required sales
of copper, lead and zinc or ores containing such
metals to smelters at ceiling prices, but permitted
Metals Reserve Company 'pursuant to the premium
price plan announced by the Federal Loan Agency, the
War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration,' to pay the premium price or subsidy
and provided it 'should exempt from the maximum
regulations'. There should be little doubt then that
the extra amount paid for metal in over-quota ores
is part of a price."
These so-called subsidy payments were certainly not outright gifts. The Appellants themselves state that the payments
were made for over-quota production and if they failed to
meet their quota no payments were made by Metals Reserve
Company. A real, tangible and valuable consideration existed
for the subsidy payments. As was stated in the case of Helveringvs. Clairborne-Annapolis ferry Co. (CCA 4th) 93 Fed. 2d
875:
"Bounties granted by a government are never pure
donations but are allowed either in consideration of
services rendered or to be rendered, objects of pubLic
interest to be obtained, production or manufacture to
be stimulated, or moral obligations to be recognized."
See also Allen vs. Smith, 173 U.S. 389, 402; 19 Sup. Ct. 446, 451;
43 L. Ed. 741; also Baboquivari Cattle Co. vs. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CCA 9th) 135 Fed. (2d) 114.
It is our contention that the reasoning and rules laid
down by this court in Combined Metals Reduction, Co. vs.
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State Tax Commission, supra, apply and are controUing in
connection with the cases here involving the occupation tax.
The contention of the Appellants is, however, that such case
is not controlling and has no bearing on this matter now before
~he court. Appellants' contention i~ based upon the fact that
tne· court stated therein:
"We base our conclusion that premium payments were
made for ores sold and not for the mere production
of such ores upon part of a joint statement issued in
February, 1942, by the War Produciton Board and
the Office of Price Administration, wherein it is stated:
'Premium payments will be based upon metal paid
for under the terms of settlement contracts. Quotas,
of course, will be fixed on the same basis. If no settlement contracts exist, quotas and premium payments
will be computed on the basis of 95, 90 and 85 per
cent of the metal content, in the case of copper, lead
and zinc, respectively .. .' It is self-evident that metals
are not paid for under settlement contracts unless such
metals are sold. (Italics added).
"Since it appears that the 'premium prices' paid to
the mining companies are for metals sold by them,
and since our occupation tax statute provides that the
basis for determining the amount of taxes due where
there has been a sale of metals under a bona fide
contract of sale is 'the amount of money or its equivalent actually received . . . from the sale . . .' it is
our opinion that the lower court erred in holding that
the 'premium payments' received from the Metals
Reserve Company should not have been included by
the Tax Commission in determining the amounts due."
Appellants' contention is that the statement referred to
by the court in the above quotation was that contained in original Rule 13, which rule was subsequently amended. The
8
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con~ention is further made that inasmuch as the Appellants.

allege in their complaints in the said cases that the amended
Rule 13 provided that subsidy payments would be based on
certain stated percentages for respective metals regardless of
the percentages of the metals actually recovered or paid for
under mine-smelter contracts or mill-smelter contracts or minemill contracts, and that they further alleged that such amended
Rule 13 did not require as a condition of payment of subsidies
that the ores be sold on account of the production of whi-:h
such bonuses were payable, that we must conclude that the
payment of the subsidies had no relationship to the sale of
the ore or metals produced.
Such a conclusion cannot be properly drawn. The allegation in the complaint as amended to the effect that the
amounts received as subsidies from Metals Reserve Compa3y
were not amounts received by plaintiff from the sal_e of suet!
ores nor the gross value thereof are certainly nothing but conclusions of law. This is the very question at issue - the very
legal conclusion to be determined. Where the complaint sets
forth various facts in regard to methods of procedure, this
court will determine from such facts the ultimate legal conclusion as to whether or not amounts received. by the plaintiff
from Metals Reserve Company were or were not received from
the sale of such ores or the gross value thereof. Hence, the
allegations in the complaint with regard thereto, being conclusions of lavv, are not binding upon the defendants and respondents herein and were not admitted by their demurrers,
since the demurrers admit only facts well pleaded and not
conclusions of law.

9
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The original Rule 13, to which this court referred in its
decision in the occupation tax cases, recognized that the ores
and metals mined by the various companies were in ordinary
course delivered to smelters or mills in connection with the
sale thereof of the ores or metals and further recognized that
in connection with most such transactions there were involved
and in existence settlement contracts. That original Rule 13,
however, further recognized that in some cases no settlement
contracts exist and provided for a method of computing premium payments in such instances. In connection with the
amended Rule 13, there is nothing to indicate that the premium
payments were thenceforth to be made for any different purpose than had been made under the original Rule 13. In fact,
the amended rules explicitly state that the purpose of changing
Rule 13 was to place premium payments on a uniform basis
and to simplify the administration of the program. Such chang~
in procedure, however, did not alter the basic facts that such
premium payments were still, as they had been before, a dehnite and integral part of the price paid for such metals or ores
in· connection with the sale thereof. Throughout the entire
program, both before Rule 13 was amended and afterw1rd,
the premium payments were made as a part of the actual tot:J.l
price authorized and pursuant to the premium price plan inaugurated jointly by the Federal Loan Agency, the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration. In other
words, utider 0. P. A. regulations made in conjunction with
the'War Production Board the prices permitted to be paid for
the metals were the ceiling prices plus the premium price.
And· the two of them together constituted the selling price of
the:· ores and metals~ The one .was never divorced from the
10
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other. We submit that the ruling of this court in the case of
Combined Metals Reduction Co. vs. State Tax Commission,
supra, is binding and controlling in the occupation tax cases
here before this court, namely, Chief Consolidated Mining Co.
vs. State Tax Commission, Silver King Coalition Mining Co.
vs. State Tax Commission and Kennecott Copper Corporation
vs. State Tax Commission, and that the order of the court
below sustaining the demurrers of the defendants in each
such case and the judgment dismissing the complaints as
amended in each of such cases should be sustained.
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION CASE
The Kennecott Copper Corporation has submitted a separate brief with regard to its particular case and has pointed
out one additional factor which it contends differentiates the
situation in Kennecott from the other cases and upon which
it contends there is proper basis for reversal of the ruling
of the court below. The allegations in the Kennecott amended
complaint are in part,

" * * * but said subsidies are nevertheless paid
by said Metals Reserve Company without regard ro
date or fact of sale, are not computed on the refined
metal produced or the sales prices thereof, and the
refined metal is plaintiffs' ultimate product and plaintiffs' only product that is sold or that is commercial
in character." (Kennecott Record 23).
With regard to such allegations we submit again that
they are conclusions of law-a legal conclusion as to the very
question to be determined by these actions.
Furthermore, the pleadings of the Appellant, Kennecott
Copper Corporation, must be taken as a whole and considered
11
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as one unit. When so taken, such pleadings do not bear out
the theory .and contentions of Appellant as to the nature,
purpose, and method of payment of the premium price monie5.
The amended complaint refers to a copy of the agreement
under which said subsidies were paid the plaintiff and the
form of the affidavit periodically submitted by plaintiff in connection with which said subsidy payments were made, said
agreement and affidavit being marked exhibit "A" and made

::cl

a part of the amended complaint. Although the complaint
alleges that the payments were made without regard to the
date or fact of sale (Kennecott Record 23), it is significant
to note from the affidavit referred to as part of exhibit "A'
attached to said amended complaint that the portion thereof
entitled "Receipt from Producer" reads as follows:
"This is to certify to the Metals Reserve Company
that the undersigned has received from the American
Smelting and Refining Company, as agent for Metals
Reserve Company, $623,700,091.30 as a premium on
12,475,826 pounds of copper * * * delivered and
sold in excess of (his) (its) monthly production quota
as stated in the above affidavit." (Kennecott Record
30).
Inasmuch as the Kennecott Copper Company in its complaint alleges that such affidavit and the receipt attached thereto
were the ones customarily used by it, and inasmuch as the
producer, the Kennecott Copper Corporation, signed such
receipt and by such receipt stated that it had received certain
payments on account of copper delivered and sold, we certainly
must conclude that the premium payments made to Kennecott
Copper Corporation did have some relationship to the sale of
.the. ore. or. metals.
12
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ARGUMENT II
THE SUBSIDY PAYMENTS UNDER THE PREMIUM
PRICE PLAN WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN DETERMINING GROSS PROCEEDS AND THEREBY FIXING
THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE MINES.
It seems very clear that the two net proceeds tax cases
here involved, namely, Park Utah Consolidated Mining Company vs. Summit County and United States Smelting, Refining
and Mining Company vs. Salt Lake County, fall squarely
within the ruling and reasoning 9f this court in the case of
United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Company vs.
Haynes, 176 P. (2d) 622, which we will refer to hereinafter as
the Haynes case. The Appellants seek to distinguish the present
cases from the Haynes case, claiming that in these cases it is
shown that there was not either a sale of ores or metals or a
conversion of ores or metals into money or the equivalent of
money.
What has been said with regard to the occupation tax
cases on the matter of a sale of the ores applies with equal
force to the net proceeds cases. It is not necessary, however,
to rely upon the matter of a sale of the ores or the metals in
connection with these net proceeds cases. In the Haynes case,
supra, the court recognized that under the provisions of Section 80-5-57, Utah Code Annotated 1943, proceeds realized
in addition to those from a sale of the ores or the metals, from
"a conversion of ores or metals into money or the equivalent
of money" should properly be considered in arriving at the
tax base. Under the Utah Statutes the base for determining
the taxes from mines includes what is annually realized from
13
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the product of the mine, over and above the cost of expenses
of obtaining such proceeds and includes the value of the ore,
etc., produced but not sold during the year. Mercur Mining &
Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 52 P. 382; Tintic Standard
lviin. Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491,497, 15 P.(2d) 633; Sait
Lake County v. Utah Copper Co., 294 Fed. 199, 264 U.S. 590,
68 L. Ed. 864, 44 Sup. Ct. 403; 267 U.S. 610, 69 L. Ed. 813,
45 Sup. Ct. 461. The Appellants contend that by reason of the
allegations contained in the second amendment to Amended
·Complaint and numbered paragraph lOa (Record 31, Case
7334), that the present cases do not come within the rule
laid down by this court in the Haynes case heretofore decided
and above cited. That allegation was as follows:
"Monthly production quotas were computed and premiums were paid on the basis of the percentage of
the total metal contents of the qualified materials
in the ores from time to time specified under Amended
Rule 13 of the Quota Committee, and for the purpose
of determining the amount of premiums payable, such
total metal contents were determined by sampling and
assaying before any conversion of the ores and before
any processing of the ores other than such crushing
as is required to per!Jlit of sampling for assaying."
(Italics added).
Appellants argue that for the purpose of the present
proceeding the allegation of the complaint must be accepted
as correct and hence we must accept as true the statement thJ.t
the payment of premium prices was not conditioned upon a
sale of the ores nor upon their conversion into money or the
equivalent of money.

We respectfully submit that the allegation that such tot-:tl
14
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metal contents were determined "before any conversion of the
ores" is a conclusion of law. The very question to be determined would be as to whether or not there was a conversion
of the ores into money or the equivalent of money. Being a
conclusion of law, such allegation would not be admitted by
the demurrer because it would not be a fact well pleaded.
We particularly call the attention of the court to the
language used by this court in the Haynes case, wherein the
court stated:
"Are the 'premium payments' money received from
a sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of
ores extracted from the mine or mining claim? Th~1t
the 'premium payments' are tied tight to ores extracted
from a mining claim is not disputed, nor could it well
be. These payments are made only on metals produced from a mine or mining claim over the assigned
quota. But the statute confines the tax base to proceeds realized from: (a) a sale of ores or metals;
(b) a conversion of ores or metals into money or the
equivalent of money. We consider them in the reverse
order.

"(2,3) Premium payments apply only to ores shipped
to the smelter or reduction works. They are made on
the basis of the determined metal content of the precipitates and concentrates delivered to the smelting
company. In other words, the premium payments ue
made only on and when the ores extracted from the
mine are converted into concentrates or bullion where
the quantity of the various metals is readily determinable and the value thereof easily computable. When
the extracted ores have been converted or refined into
metals in such form that they have a ready market at
definite or readily determinable prices so that at any
time the miner can dispose of them and receive the

15
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money therefor, they have ·been converted into the:
equivalent of money, and are to be included in the
computation of gross proceeds for the purpose of fixing valuation or tax base. Salt Lake County v. Utah
Copper Co., 10 Cir., 93 F. ( 2d) 127 (certiorari denied
303 U.S. 652, 58 S. Ct. 750, 82 L. Ed. 1112). See also
Sec. 80-5-59, U.C.A. 1943; Mercur Gold Mining & Mill
Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 52 P. 382. But in fixing the
value or monetary equivalent of the refined metals
bullion or concentrates for determination of the gross
proceeds, are the premium payments to be included
as part of the proceeds realized from ores extracted
from the mine? There can be no question but that
these premium payments accrue to the miner from
the converting, or rendering, into a marketable condition (the equivalent of money) of ores extracted
from the mine. They are therefore 'proceeds realized'
from ores extracted from such mine. And since the
tax base or valuation is fixed from the gross, total or
whole proceeds so accruing, these payments must be
included in computing the gross proceeds realized."
Even if we accept the theory and argument of the Appellants that in connection with these net proceeds cases the
payment of the premium payments had no relationship whatsoever to any sale (which, of course, we do not admit), nevertheless even under that theory amended Rule 13 to which the
Appellants refer and which is made a part of their complaint
ii1 these cases, provided that the premium payments should
be made on the basis of ore sent to the mills or smelter, or
reduction plants. The mining companies did not have to wait
for a determination of the exact metal content but the amount
of the premium payment was fixed by a formula. So that ;tt
the very instant such ores were sent to the smelter they had
a·· very definite fixed value, namely, the ceiling price plus (in
16
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the case of over-quota ores) the premium payment which. irri:;
mediately became due thereon, based upon the formula.
The premium in connection with the net proceeds ·cases
here, falls squarely within the rule laid down in the Haynes
case, without regard to the question of whether or not such
funds were realized from a sale of the ores or metals. When
the ores were taken out of the mine and were sent to the
smelter or to the mill, such ores immediately had a value in
addition to their ceiling price, namely the amount which was
payable for such ores as premium payments. What difference
could it possibly make that for purposes of uniformity the
premium price was based on a formula rather than an actur1l
assay of the metal content? The premium payments were
received on account of and for said ore. How could any
fair minded person state that such payments were not received
in connection with 1. conversion of the ores or metals into
money or the equivalent of money? Such payments represented a definite part of the value,-yes, a part of the price
paid for-the ores. Certainly, as stated by the court in the
Haynes case, such proceeds received as premium payments
were "proceeds realized" from ores extracted from the mind.
It will be observed that in Appellant's brief they refe-~
particularly to the situation of Park Utah Consolidated Mines
Co., and endeavor from that to show that because of th~
nature of the payments made to Park Utah they could not have
any relationship to the ores and could not have been proceed~
realized from the sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of the ores. We believe that the argument presented by
them proves just the contrary. It will be observed that eve~1
17
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though the quotas of this company '·ere changed from time
to time beta use of· alleged representations ·by the company
that the quotas were not sufficient to permit operation due to
excessive costs in connection with unwatering of the mine and
other projects, nevertheless it still appears affirmatively that
where there was no production, that is, when there was no ore
~aken from the mine that there were no premium payments
due or payable, but when ores were taken from the mine
tinder the zero quota, premium payments became immediately
due upon the ore so produced and when the other quotas were
established and ore in excess of such quotas was taken from
the mine and produced then there became due upon the ore
so produced premium payments. Such premium payments
certainly were proceeds realized from the s~le or conversion
into money or its equivalent of the ores. They certainly had a
very definite fixed relationship to the ores and were a part of
the value and price paid for the ores. In this connection it is
interesting to note that under the pleadings and theory of
the Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co., it seeks to exclude
from "gross proceeds" the premium payments but insists on
ded~cting. from the gross proceeds, without premium payments
included, all the costs involved in mining, extracting and
smelting the metalic ores on which the premium payments
were made. Referring to the figures in its complaint, it received from International Smelting and Refining Co. anJ
American Smelting and Refining Company cash under bona
fide contracts of sale of its ores in the amount of $820,295.32.
(Park Utah Record 10). It likewise, however, received as
p'reinium payments in connection with the production of said
ores a· 'sum of :$536,991.38. · But the mining company sought
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to deduct the cost of producing said ore as permitted by section 80-5-57 U.C.A. 1943, only from the amount received from
the smelting and refining companies (without including premium payments) and in doing so stated that such costs ex-·
ceeded the amount so received. The companies contended
that the amount received as premium payments should not
have been included and considered. On this basis they contended that there were no net proceeds. In other words, they
choose to charge off the cost of production against the taxable
value of such ore produced but do not wish to include as a
part of that taxable value an amount actually received for
the production of the ore and which certainly amounted to
and was a part of the value of the ore. It is interesting to
note that such a situation was commented upon by this court
in the Haynes case, supra, the court therein indicating that
the inclusion of the premium payments would tend to equalize
and render uniform the tax base and the assessment.

ARGUMENT Ila
THE INCLUSION OF PAYMENTS UNDER THE PREMIUM PRICE PLAN IN THE NET PROCEEDS TAX
BASE WOULD NOT BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It is the contention of Appellants that the inclusion of
subsidies in the net proceeds tax base would be unc?nstitutional as in contravention of sections 2 and 3 of article XIII
of the Constitution of the State of Utah and also section 2
of Article I and section 24 of Article I of the Constitution of
the State of Utah. All of said sections relate to unif()rmity
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m connection w1th the assessment and taxation of tangible
personal property and to the rights of the people to equal
protection of the laws and uniformity in operation of the
laws. These same contentions were made in the Haynes ca~e,
supra. The contentions were clearly and ably disposed of
in the opinion of the court in that case, the court holding that
there was no valid constitutional objection, either state or
federal to the computation of the tax base as used by the Tax
Commission and that the inclusion of subsidies in the net
proceeds tax base was entirely constitutional. In that case
this court, after argument of the case, requested that counsel
submit a supplemental brief on the constitutional questions. A
rather lengthy brief was prepared and filed by counsel for the
defendant, Haynes, County Treasurer of Tooele County, bearing
up6ri this question. In view of the fact that the matter was
thoroughly presented and considered in the Haynes case and
since the court adopted the theory of the defendants in that
case and held that there was no constitutional objection to
the inclusion of such subsidies in the net proceeds tax base;
and sjnce we feel that the holding of the court in the Haynes
case is in point and binding with regard to that matter, we
have not thought it either necessary or proper to burden the
court with other arguments or citations with regard to su~h
point in connection with the present cases.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the premium
price payments were definitely tied into and were a part of the
sale price· of the ores received by -the mining companies for
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the ores or metals sold under bona fide contracts of sale, and
were properly included in fixing the occupation taxes; that
such premium price payments were without question a part
of the gross proceeds realized from the sale or conversion into
rnoney or its equivalent of ores from the mines and therefore
properly to be considered in connection with fixing the net
proceeds tax; and that there is no constitutional objection to
the inclusion of said premium payments in computing either
the occupation tax or the net proceeds tax.
By stipulation these five cases have been consolidated for
the purpose of briefing and argument but separate decisions
should be rendered in connection with each case in view of the
different statutes involved in the occupation tax cases and the
net proceeds tax cases.
We respectfully submit that the ruling and judgment of
the court below in each case should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General
]. LAMBERT GIBSON
Deputy Attorney Generctl
ZAR E. HAYES
Special Assistant Attorney Gener~tl
P. H. NEELEY
Summit County Attorney
EDWARD M. MORRISSEY
Salt Lake County Attorney
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